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Abstract
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questionnaires of teachers and principals in three sites to measure the motivational effects of schoolbased performance award (SBPA) programs. When a school met preset educational objectives, usually
related to increases in student achievement, the SBPA programs in Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North
Carolina) and Kentucky provided salary bonuses to all the teachers in the school and the SBPA program in
Maryland provided a monetary award to the school for school improvements.
CPRE researchers found that the SBPA programs in two of the three sites helped teachers focus on
student performance goals. However, the motivational power of the programs varied due to differences in
teachers’ beliefs. For instance, it mattered whether teachers believed their individual effort would lead to
increases in schoolwide student performance, the SBPA system was fair and the award amount was
worth the extra effort and stress, and that they would be given the award if they could produce the
improved performance results. The relationship between teachers who were motivated by school-based
performance awards or sanctions and improvements in school performance also varied and may have
been attributable to differences in the actual programs as well as the local context.
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F

rom 1995-1998, CPRE teacher compensation researchers conducted extensive interviews and
survey questionnaires of teachers and principals in three sites to measure the motivational
effects of school-based performance award (SBPA) programs. When a school met preset educational objectives,
usually related to increases in student achievement, the
SBPA programs in Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) and Kentucky provided salary bonuses to all the
teachers in the school and the SBPA program in Maryland provided a monetary award to the school for school
improvements.
CPRE researchers found that the SBPA programs in two
of the three sites helped teachers focus on student performance goals. However, the motivational power of the
programs varied due to differences in teachers’ beliefs.
For instance, it mattered whether teachers believed their
individual effort would lead to increases in schoolwide
student performance, the SBPA system was fair and the
award amount was worth the extra effort and stress, and

that they would be given the award if they could produce
the improved performance results. The relationship between teachers who were motivated by school-based performance awards or sanctions and improvements in school
performance also varied and may have been attributable to differences in the actual programs as well as the
local context.
The Consortium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE)
studies how various state and local education policies support student learning. In order to promote improvements in
policy design and implementation, CPRE currently conducts
research in four areas vital to education reform: accountability, capacity-building, governance, and school finance and resource reallocation. Among these studies is the Teacher Compensation project, which through research, conceptual development, and technical assistance seeks to explore ways in
which compensation might be better used to support the education of all students to high standards and the continued
professionalization of teaching. The project seeks to better
understand the role of compensation in organizational devel-
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opment and ultimately to build on the strengths of existing
compensation systems in education and other sectors to make
compensation an important element in the support of standards-based education reform and teaching excellence.
Previous CPRE publications, such as Susan Fuhrman’s The
New Accountability (1999), emphasize the importance of
linking policy concepts to achieve the greatest effect. For
instance, new accountability systems that contain clear standards and strong incentives, but pay no attention to building
the capacity of teachers and administrators to support such
efforts, will not work. Conversely, capacity-building without
a clear system goal might also be ineffective.
One popular accountability strategy being used by an increasing number of states and districts across the country is schoolbased performance award programs. These programs are
intended to align individual or school-level monetary incentives with a school’s ability to improve student achievement.
CPRE teacher compensation researchers examined several
school-based performance award programs to see if the design and implementation of the programs achieved the intended results.

Description of the Study
Through on-site interviews with teachers and principals (all
sites), and mail surveys of teachers (Charlotte-Mecklenburg
and Kentucky) and principals (all three sites), CPRE researchers studied the motivational effects of school-based performance award programs and whether teachers’ reactions
correlated with improved student achievement. The researchers used as their conceptual framework two well-known theories of individual motivation: expectancy theory and goal-setting theory, which have an extensive research base. The research design was not intended to measure if SBPA programs caused improvements in student achievement but
rather to discern the motivational effects of the SBPA programs on teachers.

The first motivational theory, expectancy theory, suggests
that teachers are most motivated when they have a strong
belief that they can achieve specified goals—their individual
actions will positively influence student achievement and valued consequences will be achieved if the goals are met. This
theory directly links with issues of teacher and organizational
capacity, such as the extent to which teachers feel they are
supported by their principals and are given appropriate resources like professional development to reach SBPA goals.
Moreover, the motivational impact also would depend on
whether teachers feel they have the pedagogical and content
knowledge and the curricular resources necessary to help
students reach the goals. In the context of SBPAs, the second theory, goal-setting theory, translates into the idea that
clear and specific student achievement goals are more motivating for teachers than unclear or conflicting goals.
These two theories of motivation also suggest that for SBPA
programs to work well, they need to have three major impacts on teachers. First, there would be an increased focus
on student achievement goals due to goal clarity and the attachment of valued consequences to goal achievement. Second, teachers would have increased motivation to “do what
needs to be done” to achieve the goals by increasing their
commitment to the goals and attaching desirable and undesirable outcomes to meeting or not meeting the goals. Finally,
school staff would increase their demand for the organizational resources needed for them to achieve the goals.
Six other conditions must also be present to maximize the
likelihood that SBPA programs would have these impacts on
teachers. First, teachers must believe that if they try they
can succeed in achieving program goals. Second, the positive outcomes associated with the program must be greater
than the negative outcomes, such as increased stress. Third,
the bonus must be aligned with other motivating outcomes,
such as seeing one’s students achieve at higher levels. Fourth,
the SBPA program’s goals must be consistent with the goals
of other improvement programs in place at the school. Fifth,
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the program must be perceived as fair, both in the likelihood
of success and in its operation. Finally, the program must be
properly implemented—the bonus amounts must be large
enough for teachers to want to work toward the bonus, there
must be a commitment to funding and other needed resources,
the plan must be well understood and communicated, and so
on.
A brief summary of the particular SBPA programs studied
follows. Please note that although Kentucky and CharlotteMecklenburg represent two jurisdictions without formal collective bargaining (Maryland has strong collective bargaining), the findings are still relevant to contexts with stronger
union roles. CPRE is using the results of this research in its
work with the Teacher Union Reform Network to strengthen
the design of new or second generation SBPA programs.

Charlotte-Mecklenburg’s Benchmark Goals
Program
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District created the
Benchmark Goals Program in 1991 to help reverse a record
of low student achievement and limited success with minority students. The original Benchmark Goal Program set improvement goals for student achievement in nine areas: primary grade readiness, absenteeism, social studies, end-ofgrade reading, writing, pre-algebra, dropouts, higher level
course enrollment, and end-of-course subject matter mastery. Additionally, schools had between 14 and 44 sub-goals.
(There have been changes since the initial program, including the creation of a state-level SBPA program and adaptations to Charlotte-Mecklenburg’s program intended to align it
with the state program.)
Student achievement in cognitive areas was assessed by standardized multiple-choice tests, and performance baselines
were established in 1991-1992. In every area, annual improvement goals were set for schools in each subsequent
school year, and schools received points for meeting those
goals. Schools that received 75 or more points were designated as “exemplary” and their certified staff received $1,000
and support staff $400. Schools that earned between 60 and
74 points were designated as “outstanding” and their certified staff received $750 and support staff $300. Staff in
schools that earned less than 60 points were not eligible for a
bonus. There were no formal sanctions for schools that failed
to achieve the accountability goals in any one year; however,
schools with chronically low achievement could be placed in
the Priority Schools program where, with district assistance,
they prepared special improvement plans and identified resources needed to improve student achievement.

Kentucky’s Accountability Program
The Kentucky Accountability Program was created as part
of the Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990. It held
schools accountable for improvement in seven academic subjects (reading, writing, math, science, social studies, arts/humanities, and vocational/practical living), and several schoollevel indicators, such as student attendance, retention, and
dropout rates. The school performance index, derived from
assessments that were part of the Kentucky Instructional
Results Information System (KIRIS), consisted of portfolio
entries, performance events, open-response, and multiplechoice questions.
Beginning with the 1991-1992 school year, the state set a
series of two-year goals for each school, with schools expected to increase their KIRIS scores by 10 percent of the
distance between their school’s baseline score and a longterm target that is equivalent to 100 percent of students scoring at the proficient level. The initial targets were based on
the 1991-1992 score and were reset after each accountability cycle. If schools exceeded their goal, they were designated as “reward” schools and received funds that could be
used for any purpose, including salary bonuses, as decided
by a vote of the school’s certified staff. The amount awarded
to each school was based on the number of certified staff
employed and the degree to which the school exceeded its
goals. The minimum award amount was set at 50 percent of
the maximum award amount; the average bonus paid to teachers at the end of the first accountability cycle (1991-1994)
was approximately $2,600.
Schools that dropped more than five points below baseline
were designated “in crisis.” Distinguished educators—experienced teachers and administrators trained by the state to
provide technical assistance—were assigned to crisis schools
and had the authority to terminate teachers and override school
site council decisions if they deemed it appropriate. In the
first biennium of the program, the crisis category was suspended due to concerns about the reliability of the assessment instrument. The crisis category was reinstated for the
second biennium and nine schools were designated “in crisis.”

Maryland’s School Performance Program
The Maryland School Performance Program monitored school
progress toward state standards, rewarded school success
with monetary awards, and assisted or reconstituted schools
in which performance was declining. The school performance
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index, a weighted average of a school’s relative distance from
satisfactory standards for attendance and student performance on two tests (the Maryland School Performance Assessment Program and the Maryland Functional Test) was
used to measure school performance and progress.
Elementary and middle schools that achieved a “sustained
and significant” level of improvement as judged by the Maryland Department of Education were eligible for a monetary
bonus that could be used for school improvements but not for
bonuses to staff. The amount of each school’s award depended on the size of the state appropriation, the number of
eligible schools, and the number of students in the reward
schools. Between 1996 and 1998, awards ranged from about
$14,500 to $64,600 per school.
The Maryland State Department of Education released a
report card each December on state and district progress
toward meeting the standards, thus creating incentives in the
form of public recognition or public criticism. Schools that
failed to improve faced the possibility of some form of reconstitution, such as modifying the school’s instructional program,
replacing the school’s administrative or teaching personnel,
or even having a third party contracted to run the school. To
date, 97 schools have been listed as eligible for reconstitution, with the majority of them being in Baltimore City.

What We Learned
Our empirical research showed that teachers working in SBPA
program schools knew the goals of the program, understood
them, and were committed to their achievement at high levels relative to other types of education reform efforts. Teachers who placed greater value on the bonus, and believed that
if performance improved the bonus would be paid as promised, reported higher levels of goal clarity and commitment.
Most teachers reported that they were trying to meet the
goals of the program.
Goal clarity was positively related to school performance.
Our research suggested that providing rewards for too many
goals could diffuse effort and responsibility so teachers would
lose focus on what steps they could take to achieve the goals.
Conversely, limiting rewards to too few goals, just reading
and mathematics achievement, for example, could result in
inattention to important but unmeasured outcomes.
Similarly, our research found that the goals of the program
must be consistent with the goals of other organizational programs or the motivational power of SBPA programs was
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Impact of SBPA Programs
•
•
•

Focuses attention on goals
Motivates teachers
Channels organizational resources

diluted. Teachers in schools with strong conflicting goals were
less likely to believe that they could achieve the goals and,
indeed, their schools were less successful in improving student performance. Also, schools with goal conflict—for example, magnet schools with strong themes that diverged from
the SBPA program goals—often lacked principal leadership
that directed teachers to focus on SBPA program goals. This
put teachers in the position of having to choose between the
SBPA goals or the magnet school goals.
Research showed that the most important motivational factor in determining whether schools succeeded in meeting the
SBPA performance goals was whether teachers thought they
could collectively produce the desired improvements. But at
the same time, we found that teacher expectancy was quite
low in the SBPA programs we studied. Our research suggested that expectancy was influenced by the presence of
various capacity-building conditions and other supportive district actions, like the creation of an information system and
leadership from the principal and central office around standards-based instruction. Also important was teacher knowledge and skills related to improved instruction.
The alignment of vital organizational resources to help teachers improve student performance was identified as important. Specifically, we found that the more successful schools
were characterized by strong principal and district leadership
supporting program goals, feedback on student assessment
measures and results, a history of success with the program,
meaningful professional development related to program goals,
and structured teacher collaboration. Our research suggested
that SBPA programs should be combined with other policies
to build school and teacher capacity effectively and to align
internal accountability systems with external accountability
goals. The programs also should provide focused attention at
all levels on achieving improvement goals.
With respect to the bonus itself, our research showed that
the salary bonus is one of the top four valued outcomes that
teachers experienced as a result of the SBPA program (See
Table 1). Other valued outcomes included personal satisfaction from meeting program goals and from seeing improved
student performance, opportunities to work with other teach-

Table 1
a

Desirability of Outcomes Associated with School-Based Performance Award Programs
b

Outcome

Goal Attainment Rewards
Receiving a bonus for meeting goalsc
Receiving school improvement funds for meeting goals
Public recognition for meeting goals
Personal satisfaction for meeting goals
Personal satisfaction from improved student performance
Learning
Participation in education reform program
Having clear school-wide goals
Working cooperatively with other teachers on curriculum and instruction
Having your students learn new skills
Having additional opportunities for professional development
Sanctions
Public criticism or embarrassment due to not achieving goalsd
Loss of professional pride due to not achieving goalsd
Risks to job securityd
Interventiond,e
Stress
Putting in more hours
Less freedom to teach things unrelated to goals
More pressure and job stress

Charlotte-Mecklenburg
(Mean)

Kentucky
(Mean)

4.5
4.4
4.1
4.3
4.6

4.1
4.1
4.0
4.2
4.4

3.6
4.4
4.3
4.5
4.3

3.2
4.3
4.0
4.4
3.9

4.4
3.6
3.9
3.7

1.6
1.8
1.6
1.8

2.0
2.0
1.6

1.9
1.9
1.5

a.

Scale: 1 = highly undesirable…5 = highly desirable.

b.
c.
d.

All differences between comparable Charlotte-Mecklenburg and Kentucky averages are statistically significant at the .05 level or beyond.
$1,000 in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, $2,000 in Kentucky.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg respondents were asked to rate the desirability of avoiding these outcomes; Kentucky respondents were asked to rate the
desirability or undesirability of the outcomes themselves.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg respondents were asked about having their school designated a Priority School; Kentucky respondents were asked about
having a Distinguished Educator assigned to their school.

e.

ers, public recognition for school success in meeting goals,
and opportunities to work toward clear school-wide goals.
The bonus, together with these other rewards produced by
the SBPA program, provided a strong motivation to change
teaching practice.
Research did reveal that SBPA programs could also produce
some negative consequences. Teachers indicated that in the
process of trying to achieve the goals, they experienced a
number of negative outcomes, including increased pressure
and stress and increased hours worked. Programs with externally imposed standards and continuous improvement components, such as those in Kentucky and CharlotteMecklenburg, produced higher levels of pressure and stress
than programs without these design features.
Teachers believed that payment of a bonus was appropriate
for improvements in school performance; however, in some
cases, the bonus was not deemed large enough to be a mean-

ingful incentive for teachers to be motivated by it. Teachers
agreed that larger bonuses would be more motivating and
that if bonuses were too small, teachers might view them
more as insults than incentives. For example, CharlotteMecklenburg teachers complained that in light of overall low
wages for teachers, the relatively small bonus ($400 to $600
after taxes) was too small to be viewed as a reward for all
the additional work it took to earn it.
Further, while the desirability of receiving a bonus was rated
relatively high, teachers were not certain that if they achieved
the goals they would actually receive the bonus. The doubt
about receiving the earned bonuses appeared attributable either to past experiences with bonuses being reneged or to
beliefs that the funding for the bonuses would be discontinued. However, despite the general suspicion about actually
receiving an earned bonus, teachers in schools that had
achieved reward status were more likely to believe that if
they met the goals they would be rewarded again.
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Checklist for Creating a More Successful SBPA Program
___

Provide feedback on the results of past assessments to help teachers refine curriculum and instruction.

___

Make sure SBPA goals do not compete with other school goals.

___

Institutionalize a consistent source of funding for school-based performance awards.

___

Set the bonus amount high enough to compensate for increased stress and hours worked.

___

Involve teachers in the design and implementation process so they help decide the level of improvement sought
and the mechanics of the program.

___

Measure every performance goal in a systematic, valid, and reliable way.

___

Select equitable measures that address student mobility, students with disabilities, limited English proficient
students, students from low-income backgrounds, etc. to calculate rewards.

___

Attain the active support of the principal.

___

Evaluate and adjust the SBPA program as needed.

In addition to the above checklist, more information on SBPA program design and administration can be found in
the paper, “School-Based Performance Award Programs: Design and Administration Issues Synthesized from
Eight Programs,” by Allan Odden, Eileen Kellor, Herbert Heneman, and Anthony Milanowski. The paper is the
outgrowth of a research conference on designing and administering SBPA programs sponsored by CPRE-University of Wisconsin in October 1998. The paper is available at www.wcer.wisc.edu/cpre/teachercomp/.
Research also revealed that fairness was central to the success of SBPA programs. For this purpose we defined two
types of fairness: substantive fairness—the development
of program designs that adequately account for differences
in student populations and school resources; and procedural
fairness—establishing, communicating, and following the rules
so that teachers know what is expected of them. Procedural
fairness also involves providing and following an appeal procedure and treating teachers or schools equitably according
to program rules. Both types of fairness appear to be important in order for SBPA programs to be motivating.
We found that, on average, teachers neither agreed nor disagreed that the SBPA programs were substantively fair, and
they slightly disagreed that the programs were procedurally
fair. Both types of fairness proved to be related to teacher
expectancy, with teachers who perceived the programs as
fair to be more likely to believe that their efforts could improve student performance.
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Implications for Policymakers
It would be inappropriate to suggest that there is only one
way to design an SBPA program aimed at improving student
achievement. It is evident from the research findings noted
above that there is variation in both teacher attitudes and in
actual outcomes. However, we believe that our research findings have important policy implications for people who are
designing an SBPA program.
SBPA programs work by producing high levels of awareness of program goals and by focusing teacher, school, and
district efforts on goal achievement. Thus, the power of SBPA
programs is in their ability to focus teacher efforts and channel organizational resources to key educational goals. To that
end, program designers must consciously and deliberately
align SBPA goals with other school goals. If perfect alignment is not possible, the relative priority of the SBPA goals
compared to other goals must be made very clear.

For an SBPA to be successful, teachers must believe that if
they try they can succeed in achieving program goals (teacher
expectancy). Thus, the power of SBPA programs to motivate could be greatly strengthened by increasing teacher expectancy. One way to do this is by providing more of the
conditions needed for the goals to be met; the SBPA program can create or enhance the presence of these conditions. For example, teachers may have more opportunities to
collaborate about educational goals as a result of the accountability program. Similarly, school-based performance award
programs can foster goal focus, enhance the development of
relevant teacher knowledge and skills through opportunities
for professional development, focus district efforts, and provide guidelines for policy consistency. The development of
knowledge- and skill-based pay and the creation of interventions, such as the Kentucky Distinguished Educator program,
for declining schools are but two additional efforts that could
enhance the necessary enabling conditions.
Program designers should look to developing rich human capital resources in schools. This can take many forms, including
providing appropriate and meaningful professional development opportunities for teachers as well as providing opportunities for teachers to use their strengths in areas beyond the
classroom. Linking compensation to knowledge and skills and
appropriate professional development can also increase
teacher buy-in and motivation to change their practice to improve student achievement.
Another strategy is to establish professional networks external to the school that give teachers insight into program goals
and strategies for improvement. For example, in Kentucky,
some schools that failed to achieve program goals were provided external educational experts in the subsequent year
who worked individually and collectively with teachers to
develop teacher knowledge and skills needed to achieve program goals.
A specific area that our research identified as in need of
additional focused attention is more active support and program management from principals. The active commitment
of principals is crucial to the success of SBPA programs, yet
principals often have little or no guidance from the district or
state as to how to carry out program goals. Our site interviews revealed a high level of variability in the extent to which
the principals fostered teacher commitment to the program.
While some were very proactive, others seemed genuinely
at a loss as to how to rally their staff and help them achieve
the goals. Thus, for an SBPA program to have maximum
motivating effect, program designers must pay specific attention to the critical variable of principal leadership.

Program designers must be sure to provide positive outcomes
that outweigh the negative outcomes to make it more likely
that teachers will change their behaviors in order to meet the
goals and receive the salary bonus. A basic assumption underlying SBPA program design is that the goal and the award
will act as an incentive; paying salary bonuses appears to
provide stronger incentives than other types of performance
outcomes, such as publicity and bonuses paid in the form of
school improvement funds. Nonetheless, there are trade-offs
in any design approach and while continuous improvement
and externally imposed standards increase pressure and
stress, they also are likely to produce more significant changes
to curriculum and instruction over time.
Thus, for an SBPA to be motivating, program designers must
be sure that teachers will believe that the bonus and other
outcomes associated with goal achievement are worth the
effort. One way to do this is to enhance positive outcomes by
providing larger award amounts, better feedback on student
performance, and enhanced opportunities for teacher collaboration and professional growth. The evidence from our
research combined with research on bonus incentives in other
types of organizations suggest that bonuses equivalent to 3-5
percent of base salary (about $2,000 per teacher per year)
would be meaningful and motivating.
Program designers also must set goals at a level that is achievable so teachers will perceive that they are capable of meeting the goal and thus receiving the award. In addition, teachers must have faith that the award will actually be given to
those who meet the goals. This trust could be strengthened
by improving communication between labor and management,
by attaining a strong and sustained policymaker commitment
to the SBPA program, and by providing a funding source that
is insulated from cuts due to cyclical variations in educational
resources.
Our research suggests that program designers can enhance
both substantive and procedural fairness through the involvement of all key parties in the design process to ensure that
variations in school context are adequately addressed in the
program design. In addition, the program should include an
ongoing and significant investment in communication to teachers, principals, district administrators, parents, and the public.
The information communicated to these stakeholder groups
should go beyond a brief overview of the program. It should
include information about program rules and procedures, program outcomes, appeal procedures, material to be covered
on the assessment, rubrics and procedures for grading the
assessments, changes in the program or assessment, and program rationale over time.
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Program designers must be sure that the goals and indicators
used to assess progress pass the “face validity” test; that is,
can teachers understand them and do they believe that the
goals and indicators are a fair assessment of educational
progress? If teachers understand and accept the goals, both
teacher expectancy and motivation to achieve the goals will
be enhanced.

Summary
SBPA programs work to focus teacher and system attention
on key educational goals. Current designs have a number of
key elements in place, such as rewards that are school-based,
a focus on continuous improvement (so each school competes with its own past performance), and frequently, implementation in the context of larger standards-based reform
efforts. These programs are most effective when they are
combined with comprehensive strategies to build school capacity and focus teacher attention and school and district
resources on achieving program goals.
However, our empirical research suggests that the motivational press of SBPA programs could be strengthened by a
better communication of goals, enhanced teacher expectancy,
enhanced teacher perceptions that earned awards will be
funded, and experimentation with larger award amounts. We
believe that policymakers could improve the design of their
SBPA programs by addressing these areas, as well as by
engaging in a participative and well-planned design process.
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More on the Subject
School-Based Performance Award Programs, Teacher
Motivation, and School Performance: Findings from a
Study of Three Programs, a new CPRE Research Report
upon which this Policy Brief was based, is now available.
The cost is $10.00 per copy. To order, write: CPRE Publications, 3440 Market Street, Suite 560, Philadelphia PA 191043325.
Prices include handling and book-rate postage (Add $10 shipping and handling for delivery outside the U.S.). Sales tax is
not applicable. For information on quantity discounts (over
25 copies), call 215/573-0700. Sorry, we cannot accept returns, credit card orders, or purchase orders. All orders must
be prepaid with U.S. funds from U.S. banks; make checks
payable to Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania.
Please allow 4-6 weeks for delivery.

CPRE on the Internet
For more information about CPRE’s teacher compensation project, please visit our site on the world wide web:

www.wcer.wisc.edu/cpre/teachercomp/
This web site describes the history of teacher pay, the current teacher compensation system, and explains alternative
forms of teacher compensation. The site describes the work
and key findings of CPRE’s research on teacher compensation, provides information on state and local school teacher
compensation reform initiatives, features an annotated bibliography of teacher compensation publications, and includes
a wide variety of resources on teacher compensation.

Additional information about CPRE can be found at on
the following web sites:

www.wcer.wisc.edu/cpre/
This site features information on CPRE’s school finance, program adequacy, resource reallocation, and teacher compensation projects.
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www.upenn.edu/gse/cpre/
This site features a wealth of information including detailed
descriptions of current research projects, a paper of the month,
biographies of CPRE’s researchers, and links to other educational sites. Short descriptions of CPRE’s many publications are available and, at present, over 100 different publications can be downloaded from the site at no charge.

New Books by CPRE Researchers
CPRE researchers recently authored two new books based
upon CPRE research.
Can Public Schools Learn from Private Schools? Case
Studies in the Public and Private Nonprofit Sectors
Available from: Economic Policy Institute, 1660 L Street,
N.W., Suite 1200, Washington, D.C. 20036. Phone: 1-800EPI-4844. Email: publications@epinet.org. Web:
www.epinet.org. ISBN: 0-944826-84-9. (1999, $13.95).
Authors Richard Rothstein (Economic Policy Institute), Martin Carnoy (Stanford University), and Luis Benveniste (World
Bank) report on case studies conducted to determine whether
there are any private school practices that public schools can
adopt to improve student outcomes. The book reports on research funded by the Aspen Institute and the U.S. Department of Education’s National Institute on Educational Governance, Finance, Policymaking and Management.
School-Based Financing
Available from: Corwin Press, Inc., 2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks, CA 91320-2218. Phone: 805-499-9734. Email:
order@corwinpress.com. Web: www.corwinpress.com.
ISBN: 0-8039-6779-9. (1999, $54.95).
Edited by Margaret Goertz (University of Pennsylvania) and
Allan Odden (University of Wisconsin-Madison), this book
offers a conceptual overview of the issues involved in designing, implementing, and evaluating school-based financing
policies. It also reports on the experiences of three countries
that have enacted school-based financing policies, discusses
different approaches to funding schools in the United States,
and provides insight into how schools allocate and reallocate
dollars.

Recent CPRE Publications
Improving State School Finance Systems: New Realities Create Need to Re-Engineer School Finance Structures
Allan Odden
February 1999 (No. OP-04) 43 pp., $6
Explores the inadequacies of state school finance systems and recommends short-term changes that states can make to their
funding structures in order to accommodate more fundamental and long-term changes.
Instruction, Capacity, and Improvement
David Cohen and Deborah Loewenberg Ball
June 1999 (No. RR-043) 41 pp., $10
Develops a theoretical view of instruction and then provides an analysis of the environments of instruction. Concludes with a
discussion of the problems and possibilities for intervention.
School-Based Performance Award Programs, Teacher Motivation, and School Performance: Findings from a Study
of Three Programs
Carolyn Kelley, Herbert Heneman III, and Anthony Milanowski
January 2000 (No. RR-044), $10
Focuses on teachers’ motivational reactions to school-based performance award programs, the degree to which teachers’
motivational reactions are related to school performance, and principals’ assessments of the effects of the programs.
State Strategies for Building Capacity in Education: Progress and Continuing Challenges
Diane Massell
October 1998 (No. RR-041) 63 pp., $12
Examines capacity-building strategies used in eight states (California, Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, and Texas) and analyzes their promise and continuing challenges.
Teaching for High Standards: What Policymakers Need to Know and Be Able to Do
Linda Darling-Hammond and Deborah Loewenberg Ball
November 1998 (No. JRE-04) 33 pp., $10
Discusses the relationship between teacher knowledge and student performance and describes what states are doing to
provide opportunities for teacher learning and with what effects. Summarizes what research suggests about the kinds of
teacher education and professional development that teachers need in order to learn how to teach to high standards. (Co-published
by CPRE and the National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future).
When Accountability Knocks, Will Anyone Answer?
Charles Abelmann and Richard Elmore, with Johanna Even, Susan Kenyon, and Joanne Marshall
March 1999 (No. RR-042) 51 pp., $10
Presents a working theory of school-site accountability among three factors: responsibility, expectations, and internal and
external accountability. Short case studies of a diverse sample of schools are included.
To order, write: CPRE Publications, 3440 Market Street, Suite 560, Philadelphia PA 19104-3325. Prices include handling and book-rate
postage (Add $10 shipping and handling for delivery outside the U.S.). Sales tax is not applicable. For information on quantity
discounts (over 25 copies), call 215/573-0700. Sorry, we cannot accept returns, credit card orders, or purchase orders. All orders must
be prepaid with U.S. funds from U.S. banks; make checks payable to CPRE/Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania. Please allow
4-6 weeks for delivery.
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About CPRE

Nondiscrimination Statement

The Consortium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE)
unites five of the nation’s leading research institutions to improve elementary and secondary education through research
on policy, finance, school reform, and school governance.
Members of CPRE are the University of Pennsylvania,
Harvard University, Stanford University, the University of
Michigan, and the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

The University of Pennsylvania values diversity and seeks
talented students, faculty, and staff from diverse backgrounds.
The University of Pennsylvania does not discriminate on the
basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, color, national
or ethnic origin, age, disability, or status as a Vietnam era
veteran or disabled veteran in the administration of educational policies, programs, or activities; admissions policies,
scholarships, or loan awards; and athletic or University administered programs or employment. Questions or complaints
regarding this policy should be directed to Executive Director, Office of Affirmative Action, 1133 Blockley Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6021 or (215) 898-6993 (Voice) or (215)
898-7803 (TDD).

CPRE conducts research on issues such as:
• education reform
• student and teacher standards
• state and local policymaking
• education governance
• school finance
• teacher compensation
• student incentives
To learn more about CPRE or CPRE publications, please
call 215/573-0700.
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